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Domestic and Foreign Policy
in Ethnic Conflict
The True Reasons for the Rwandan and
Burundian Genocides

William A. Ladnier

Ethnic conflict has been a major problem that has plagued contemporary Central
Africa, spreading across the continent. Often various tribes and ethnic groups have long
standing histories of conflict amongst themselves that may perhaps explain these
outbreaks of violence; however, far too often ethnic conflict has spawned from politics
and socio-economic biases, rather than simply cultural issues.
The colonization and seemingly nonsensical division of Africa by European
powers in the late nineteenth century did nothing to prevent or stave ethnic conflict in the
coming decades—indeed the politically motivated creation of new borders on the
continent at least moderately contributed to later ethnic conflict. But did the festering
wounds left by the European colonizers directly cause later ethnic violence? Rather than
asking such a specific question, it is better to examine these conflicts as having both
ultimate and more immediate causes. And this is how we must examine the case of
Rwanda, and even its closely related sister, Burundi: indeed, their Belgian colonizers
bred problems that ultimately led to the countries’ ethnic problems, culminating in a
number of genocides in the latter half of the twentieth century; but it was their own
people and political make-up that was directly at the root of the problem. Moreover the
ultimate and more immediate causes often comingle, as one may give rise to the other.
Because of the shifts in political power brought on by the Belgians in their countries the
various ethnic groups there became increasingly more violent. Soon violent incidents
became the norm, directly ushering in the ethnic conflicts between the Hutu and Tutsi
years later.
As with any major event, there are a multitude of complex issues that may act as
probable causes. For our purposes we will focus mainly on how the political and
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economic atmosphere in Rwanda gave rise to the violence of the genocide. Indeed,
numerous other factors contributed to the tragedy, but none of them had as strange an
influential impact as the dire political climate at the time. And in that are included
underlying issues such as the social structure in the country at the time, as well as major
economic problems that plagued Rwanda. Nevertheless we must, at the very least, treat
with some examination other factors, such as colonialism and demographics in Rwandan
history. However, the political make-up of Rwanda immediately prior to 1994 (namely
that of the Habyarimana administration), as I will argue, was the greatest of these issues
that contributed to the ethnic conflict and subsequent genocide.
Burundi is a case very similar to that of Rwanda: the two neighboring countries
housed the same Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups. Both grew from the same colonial
background. However, independence left different groups in power. In Burundi, unlike
Rwanda, the Tutsi remained the powerful ruling elites. Nevertheless, the political
underpinnings in Burundi proved to be a major factor that culminated in the 1972
genocide of the Hutu people. Again, politics prevailed over ethnic and social reasons to
explain the bloodshed.
But Burundi is a unique case in that even after the 1972 genocide bloodshed
would continue—in 1993, after the Hutu gained political power in the country, many
Tutsi were killed. Obviously, again, politics proved potent as the administration of
President Ndadaye inevitably escalated the violence associated with the 1993 genocide.
And while the circumstances in Burundi are fundamentally the same as those in the case
of Rwanda, the fact that different ethnic groups supported genocide in the two separate
countries proves that ethnicity was not the problem—politics and democratization was.

3

So what were the real causes of these ethnic tensions? Did the shared colonial
histories of Rwanda and Burundi set the stage for their respective genocide events, or did
those episodes arise from separate internal causes? In the region by this time genocide
had seemingly become the norm—in many ways an end to the violence was
unfathomable. The first Burundian genocide of 1972 offered a rallying cry for many Hutu
that would later fuel their fire to massacre the Tutsi. And that indeed happened: first in
1993 in Burundi, and then in 1994 in Rwanda. A clear connection can be made between
these latter two cases, and that connection centers on the political administrations in the
two countries at the time. The domestic politics, as well as foreign affairs, conducted by
both spelled clear doom for one ethnic group. Bloodshed ensued and was hardly staved
without foreign intervention. With the overthrow of these governments the genocides
were concluded, but the wounds remained—the memories were not forgotten, not in
Rwanda, not in Burundi, and not in Central Africa.
Indeed, the genocides in both Burundi and Rwanda were caused by governmental
policy, more so than by ethnic issues and biases. Internal factors in each country greatly
affected the escalation of tensions to a violent level. However, external factors, such as
foreign state and international institution involvement, played minor factors in causing
the genocide. Colonialism and the wounds it left were never the problem—instead the
new policies of violence and racial superiority preached by the Rwandan and Burundian
governments were the true culprits. Understanding these factors, internal and external,
political and ideological, best explains the historical progression of genocide in Central
Africa.
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To understand the true causes of these genocides helps us to learn from our
mistakes. As we work alongside other states, as we attempt to harbor better relationships
internationally, we all must work to stave violence and ethnic biases. Ethnic tension has
long proven to be an incredibly dangerous phenomenon, most often ending in the deaths
of thousands of innocent lives around the world—we need not look beyond Rwanda or
Burundi to understand that. And that alone is reason enough to study the circumstances
surrounding genocide. Armed with the knowledge of what causes genocide, we are armed
with the knowledge of how to stop it.
Discussions on humanitarianism, humanitarian intervention, and ethnic conflict
attempt to imbue humanity with a better understanding of how we can better our world,
and how we can eliminate needless violence. And in these discussions, opinions differ
about the best ways to tackle various situations. In a field of such varied views, numerous
divisions can be made. In the field, macro divisions can be drawn, between those who
support some sort of intervention, and those who believe that conflicts should be left to
play out. Intervention and ethnic conflict are themselves hotly contested issues, as debate
rages about the participation each merits from the international community, or rather
anyone other than the nation state at the center. Regardless of these divisions, however,
we must ask how these opinions are developed when thinking about the genocide in
Rwanda.
When we consider the issues at hand in Rwanda, the macro divisions become
more focused, as some argue over the construction of the genocide as “ethnic conflict,”
rather than some recent government construction. While others still focus their critiques
on the international community’s involvement in the genocide.
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Yahya Sadowski, in her article entitled “Ethnic Conflict,” broadly discusses the
place of ethnic conflict in the evolving post-Cold War international system. Sadowski
posits that while ethnic conflict itself is a long-standing historical issue, it is ultimately an
issue that continues to evolve and develop in modern times. Often “modern hate”
inflames ethnic issues ultimately into conflict, but any modern conflict never reaches a
fever pitch, so to speak, due to old wounds. As applied to Rwanda, these claims challenge
the established ideas that the genocide ultimately developed from some of the ethnic
tensions stemming from the Belgian occupation of the region. Sadowski shrugs such a
point off—arguing instead that modern hatred, especially developed by the government,
escalated tensions.
Zeric Smith, in his “The Impact of Political Liberalisation and Democratisation on
Ethnic Conflict in Africa: An Empirical Test of Common Assumptions,” argues that
other factors—such as liberalization and democratization—are more prevalent in
explaining the changing trends of ethnic conflict. In a quantitative analysis of a number
of theories concerning the relationship between conflict and civil liberties and
democracy, Smith discovered that conflict and ultimately genocide are inextricably
linked with other so-called political factors. Smith’s analysis informs us that
democratization has little to no effect on ethnic conflict. Whereas a far-reaching
democratic government might seem to produce decreased conflict, this simply was not
quantitatively demonstrable. Instead, increased liberalization—that is, the increased
allowance and support of civil liberties—clearly decreased ethnic conflicts for some time.
Given the governmental breakdown that occurred weeks before the genocide in
Rwanda, Smith’s findings become particularly applicable. The quantitative assessment of
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liberalization as a primary factor to changing the trends of ethnic conflict can be greatly
applied to a more qualitative study of the conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi. And this
lends credence and value to any study on the subject that is based wholly on mere
subjective opinion. In that respect, Smith’s study is an invaluable asset for our purposes.
Indeed, this study should be viewed alongside other works on ethnic conflict as a
supportive posit of theory. It is not, in and of itself, some sort of seminal work.
Others, like Helen Hintjens, more specifically comment on the rising and falling
actions of the genocide itself. In her article, “Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda,”
Hintjens posits a number of factors that explain the occurrence of the genocide. Departing
from some of the more common arguments, she claims that the Habyarimana
administration played an unequaled role in escalating tensions and encouraging conflict.
Hintjens, furthermore, argues that the international community along with major
international institutions, such as the IMF and World Bank, helped to influence conflict.
Many do not speak sufficiently to the effect that the international community helped raise
tensions; rather, authors more often speak about international involvement in intervention
efforts. Overall, Hintjens develops somewhat new arguments that explain some of the
multifaceted reasons behind the genocide by ultimately separating herself from the more
common claims of other authors. And indeed, Hintjens is not alone, as Catharine
Newbury, in her article “Ethnicity and the Politics of History in Rwanda,” echoes many
of the same findings, but focuses more primarily on the domestic political and historical
issues. And others still, like Peter Langford in his “The Rwandan Path to Genocide: The
Genesis of the Capacity of the Rwandan Post-Colonial State to Organize and Unleash a
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Project of Extermination,” describe exclusively the inextricable link between government
policies and genocide actions.
These articles offer a plethora of information that greatly focuses much of the
research in their field. Often authors focus their discussions of Rwanda on how the
genocide of 1994 illustrated the need for humanitarian intervention, or claims to the
contrary. In regards to the inner working of Rwanda at the time, authors commonly also
limited themselves to a discussion of the long-standing issues among the various ethnic
groups as a way to demonstrate growing tension and conflict. Nevertheless, in so vast a
field of often-repetitive information, new arguments must develop to possibly better
explain the causes and effects of the genocide in Rwanda. Smith’s and Sadowski’s
research, while it does not comment on Rwanda or Burundi in particular, does argue for
much of the reasoning that Hintjens, Newbury, Verwimp, Langford, and others employ.
It is their opposition to a simple understanding of ethnic conflict as arising solely from
ethnic tensions that is the foundation of my own research in this paper.
Hintjens, Newbury, and Langford, furthermore, also provide solid foundation to
my own research on the issues of genocide in Central Africa. Hintjens’ research focuses
primarily on the Rwandan genocide’s profound relationship with domestic political
policy and foreign economic and governmental involvement. This argues that there were
indeed both external and internal factors that caused the 1994 genocide—factors that
were more influential than simply ethnic biases. Newbury and Langford agree: the
Rwandan domestic government policies of hatred and racial superiority more so caused
the genocide than perhaps colonial memories. While their research focuses only on the
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link between Rwandan history and its domestic policies, their conclusions match that of
Hintjens, leaving little question that ethnicity was not the true problem.
Each author is equally valuable in his or her contribution to the field of research
in discovering the real causes behind genocide in Central Africa. Each offers different,
yet equally valid, reasoning for the causes of the Rwandan genocide of 1994. Sadowski
and Smith discuss the more macrocosmic reasoning behind ethnic conflict as a whole,
and how it may be applied to any given situation, while the others apply those principles
on a smaller, more focused scale. However, none provide information on the link
between the Burundian genocides and the later Rwandan genocide. Barren of any
mention of so important an event, these authors do not fully cover the gamut of
reasoning’s explaining the long history of ethnic conflicts and genocides in Central
Africa in the latter half of the twentieth century.
Indeed, little research can be unearthed that comments at all on the Burundian
genocides of either 1972 or 1993. Burundi and Rwanda shared a long cultural, ethnic,
colonial, and political history, leaving the two nations strongly linked. To leave research
on the genocide of Rwanda barren of comment on Burundi, or vice versa, is truly unfair.
The genocides of Central Africa cannot be fully explained without an understanding of
both sides of the issue, with comment on both countries, and the relationship between the
two. My research aims to do just that—to explain the relationship between the genocides
of Burundi and the genocide in Rwanda. This relationship can best be explained through
discussion of the two countries’ shared histories, political dynamics, and developing
ethnic make-ups, and how the two differ or perhaps affect one another. Indeed a link
exists between the two, and the reasons behind the ethnic tensions and conflicts in
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Central Africa cannot be fully understood without first gaining an understanding of all
the constituent issues.
In order to better understand how escalating political tensions inevitably caused
the Rwandan and Burundian genocides, we must first examine ethnic conflict as a term.
Ethnic conflict is, in many ways, any sort of major conflict between two or more ethnic
groups or between ethnic groups and the state, based primarily upon ethnically charged
issues, disagreements, or issues. Indeed, these conflicts may arise as a result of ethnic
nationalism, as is often the case; however, there need not be any single specific reasoning
at its root. Furthermore, these conflicts, due to their intense nature, often can escalate, as
with the case of Rwanda and Burundi, into genocide, which Hintjens1 defines as “a form
of one-sided mass killing in which the state or other authority intends to destroy a group,
as that group and membership in it are identified by the perpetrator.” If we maintain this
definition, we can more fully examine and understand how decades of Rwandan ethnic
conflict ultimately culminated in the 1994 genocide. But it is necessary to note an
important distinction—that ethnic conflict and other occurrences of intrastate organized
violence, such as civil wars, are not one in the same. Civil war need not be confined to
ethnic groups; rather only organized groups, such as political organizations or more
commonly armies themselves, must combat one another. Furthermore, civil wars are,
very often, confined to the borders of one nation or state, whereas the same is not
necessarily true of ethnic conflicts. Perhaps the distinctions are small, but they are
nonetheless important, because in Rwanda and Burundi ethnic conflict is most classically
considered to have occurred—not necessarily civil war.
1

Hintjens, H. M. (1999, June). Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, The Journal of
Modern African Studies, Vol. 37, No. 2, 246.
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Ethnic conflict, contrary to popular belief, is not always the product of historically
long-standing disputes. In fact, as Sadowski2 claims, “the reality is that most ethnic
conflicts are expressions of ‘modern hate’ and largely products of the twentieth century.”
And this is especially true for Africa, as many major African ethnic conflicts are able to
trace their origins to the immediate past. Furthermore, ethnic conflicts are not always
caused by cultural differences. Although cultural or caste divisions may tend to spur on
or intensify ethnic violence, nevertheless it is often only one of many contributing
factors. Smith3 proffers that ethnic conflict may find its roots in a number of things, such
as “over access to material goods as well as over intangible goods such as power, respect,
or social status.”
Prior to the twentieth century, ethnic conflict had never been a real problem in
Africa proper, much less so in Central and Eastern Africa more specifically. Prior to the
Berlin Conference of 1884, ethnic groups in the region had lived peacefully, commonly
intermarrying and building other societal bonds. But during the 1880s many of the
European powers decided, in the interest of expanded their own power, to begin
colonizing the African continent to exploit it for territorial and economic gain. Politically
motivated debate and disagreement soon followed, leaving randomly assigned borders on
the map, commonly dividing historically close ethnic groups, and often enclosing
together hostile groups. With these sudden changes what had been long-standing peaceful
unions would soon, in many tragic cases, become ultimately violent conflicts. Fortunately

2

Sadowski, Y. (1998). Ethnic Conflict, Foreign Policy, No. 111, 13.
Smith, Z. K. (2000, March). The Impact of Political Liberalisation and Democratisation
on Ethnic Conflict in Africa: An Empirical Test of Common Assumptions, The Journal
of Modern African Studies, Vo1. 38, No. 1, 24.

3

11

enough, however, this was not the case in either Rwanda or Burundi; nevertheless with
the help of inner political pressure the divides between the Tutsi and Hutu would be
highlighted and exploited, directly causing violent action.
Historically Rwanda was a unified country, sharing the same culture and political
system (a central monarchy), but there were three major castes that divided the nation
into the Hutu, Tutsi, and the Twa. Nonetheless these castes lived peacefully, commonly
intermarrying; and social mobility between the castes was not uncommon. However,
when the Germans colonized the nation after the Berlin Conference, things changed. By
the end of World War I, the League of Nations mandated that Belgium govern the area of
Ruanda-Urundi. Soon the Belgians changed the political system—they abolished the
central monarchy and set up the minority Tutsi as the ruling local elite. Soon areas that
had a long-standing history of Hutu leadership were put under the control of the Tutsi. As
evidence, until 1929 about one third of the tribal leaders in Rwanda had been Hutu, but
the Belgians quickly eliminated all non-Tutsi chiefs. By 1933 the colonial power issued
mandatory identity cards, which fixed each person’s identity as either Hutu or Tutsi,
leaving generations with an inseparable label. As Belgian backing increased, so did the
Tutsi’s ability to more widely exploit the Hutu politically.
After World War II the United Nations and other global powers began pressuring
Belgium to grant Ruanda-Urundi independence. But before they did so, the Belgians held
open elections, in which the Hutu gained a majority of seats in the legislature. Now all
the power lay in the hands of the formerly exploited majority. Extremist groups on both
ends of the spectrum gradually tried to take over, leading to massive political instability.
These seething problems overflowed when Tutsi extremists attacked Hutu leaders,
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eventually leading to a Hutu massacre of 10,000 Tutsi and the expulsion of more than
130,000 others from the country. By the time that Belgium granted Rwanda full
independence, its one-party Hutu government continued previous violence against the
Tutsi refugees. The violence, however, would not end for some time; and when Tutsi
rebel forces assassinated then-president Juvenal Habyarimana, many more Tutsi were to
be killed in 1994.
But what caused this ethnic violence? Was it the cultural and historical
differences between these two castes that eventually led to such a major genocide? No,
not entirely; instead it was political instability and social cleavages that led to ethnic
violence in Rwanda. For centuries the Hutu and Tutsi had lived in harmony. They both
lived under a central monarchy, the Banyarwanda. That only changed when the Belgians
took over the country.
Problems didn’t manifest until the Belgians decided to change the political
structure of the country, putting the Tutsi in power, subject only to the colonial
government. This action ultimately undermined the politics of the country, which had
been under the control of Hutu chiefs for years. However, before granting the country
independence, Belgium gave all political power back to the Hutu. Furthermore, while
occupying the region, the Belgians had inevitably caused changes to the philosophy of
the social structure among the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa.
The Hutu and Twa were ethnically Bantu (a group from the Great Lakes region);
however, the Tutsi were Hatitic, meaning that they were not native, like the other two
groups. Prior to European intervention none of this mattered—the Tutsi, Twa, and Hutu
all coexisted harmoniously in their society. But when the Hutu finally gained political
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power in the newly independent Rwanda, they began to “purge” the society of these
foreigners. In fact, only two years before the 1994 genocide, the major Hutu politician
Leon Mugesera heralded the genocide when he said that all Tutsi should be sent “back
home to Ethiopia,” from where they had supposedly come. It was obvious that by the
time the Belgian colonialists left the region, they had instilled in the Hutu, at the very
least, a strong zeal for their own ethnic superiority over the Tutsi. Nevertheless this zeal
was nothing compared to what the Habyarimana and earlier Kayibanda administrations
had done to instill great hatred between the two ethnic groups by 1994.
The post-independence democracy was, if anything, more of an authoritarian style
government. The first president of Rwanda, Gregoire Kayibanda, was anything but
sympathetic to the Tutsi, as his government continued to kill and expel them from the
country. Many Tutsi fled to neighboring Burundi, where they would comprise a new
government. But in light of this, Kayibanda’s regime dissolved political and economic
ties with Burundi and began to kill some 14,000 more Tutsi. Kayibanda’s government
would continue to stifle any and all Tutsi efforts for political and civil liberalization.
During a 1972 coup, Kayibanda was overthrown and killed, and Juvenal
Habyarimana became president. But his administration was worse than that of his
predecessor. Habyarimana refused to allow even basic human rights to the Tutsi, as he
continued to expel many more from the country. All vestiges of democracy in Rwanda
were disappearing as the PARMEHUTU party (the only political party allowed in
Rwanda) still controlled the legislature. In the coming years of his twenty-two year reign,
Habyarimana set himself up as an authoritarian leader in Rwanda, giving all to the Hutu,
while taking everything from the Tutsi.
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The question of whether Kayibanda’s and Habyarimana’s actions played a more
significant role in inciting the Rwandan genocide still remains. The political implications
of their administrations’ actions were certainly a contributing factor to the genocide.
Their choke-hold on the democratic institutions in Rwanda as well as their policies of
non-liberalization for Tutsi were probably the greatest contributing factor politically for
the genocide.
Many scholars have posited that democratization should bring about decreases in
ethnic conflict, whereas political liberalization will result in increases in ethnic conflict in
sub-Saharan Africa. Smith, however, found that this was not the case. In fact, the
opposite was true—democratization has little effect on ethnic conflict, while political
liberalization (greater access to civil liberties) decreases ethnic conflict. However, these
findings do not preclude the possibility that a denial of civil liberties and basic rights
would heighten ethnic violence. This seems to be the precise case in Rwanda during the
Habyarimana administration—the Hutu government openly refused the Tutsi civil
liberties and expelled them from the country (if they did not kill them), and as a result of
this treatment, tensions would eventually reach a breaking point. However, numerous
other political and economic factors played a role in ushering in the genocide.
Upon Juvenal Habyarimana’s entrance into the presidency, Rwanda was a rather
wealthy country, at least by African standards at the time. By the 1980s, Habyarimana
had ushered in a time of great prosperity for all Rwandans. Many considered Rwanda the
African model for orderliness and service: it had a great infrastructural base, there was
incredible access to health care, primary education was readily available, and clean
drinking water was abundant, all things few African countries at the time could claim.
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However, this economic prosperity didn’t last. In 1986-1987, receipts from coffee sales
fell from 14 billion to 5 billion Rwandan francs in less than a year’s time. Because the
coffee trade was so important to the Rwandan economy, external debt accumulated. As a
result redistributional and welfare policies came under mounting pressure that ultimately
affected many Hutu. But over time it became increasingly obvious that these problems
were not being blamed on external, uncontrollable factors; instead, the regime’s political
rhetoric suggested that the Tutsi, who worked as traders and merchants, were being
blamed for Rwanda’s economic collapse. As Hintjens4 states, “An uneasy coexistence
had emerged between the political and administrative Bahutu elite and the economic
Batutsi elite.”
In the face of an invasion by the Tutsi-backed Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) in
the early 1990s, the Habyarimana administration yielded to pressure from the World
Bank and IMF to implement structural adjustment programs. Of course, that meant that
Rwanda’s national currency would immediately fall in value (by about two-thirds). With
a range of other problems in Rwanda, the country could not maintain its numerous
services, and eventually the infant and maternal mortality rates rose. Nevertheless the
government did find the funds to bolster the Rwandan military forces. As a matter of fact,
Habyarimana and his political allies diverted funds from domestic services in favor of
military spending. Not only that, but citizens were encouraged by the government to form
“death squads” to fight the RPF and their Tutsi allies. Through a regimen of lies and
propaganda Habyarimana was turning the whole country against the Tutsi.

4

Hintjens, 257.
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As the country slipped further and further into economic crisis, the government
refused to make the right decisions. Whereas the Hutu political party (the only legally
permitted party) could have shared power with opposition parties, so that the World Bank
would release their funds to the desperate county, they refused flatly. As they denied to
do the right thing for their people, extremist Hutu politicians and military leaders, instead,
turned to genocide as the only solution—the Tutsi, as they claimed, had caused the
problem, and killing them was the “final solution.”
While Rwanda’s socio-economic problems snowballed, the government was
supposed to democratize the country. The terms from the IMF and World Bank were
simple: end political stalemate to access the structural adjustment program’s 30 million
dollar funds. But “the imposition of such rigid political conditionality on Rwanda’s
government hastened moves towards a violent ‘final solution’ to the country’s
socioeconomic and political problems.”5
Political liberalization, or even democratization, could have done wonders to help
prevent the genocide in Rwanda. Allowing more civil liberties and political power to the
Tutsi during the Habyarimana administration could have significantly altered the
outcome for so many innocent Rwandan victims. But sadly, none of that occurred.
Instead Juvenal Habyarimana and his political allies (the akazu) attempted to solidify
their own power, fearing that a more democratic form of government would end to their
political careers. But this only needlessly compounded the issue; and yet that may have
just been the goal—to escalate ethnic tensions between the Hutu and Tutsi by denying the
latter those essential rights. Evidence of this possible strategy may lie in the fact that the

5

Hintjens, 258.
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regime feared the rising power of the RPF and the Tutsi so much that they fabricated
rhetoric to turn the Hutu in Rwanda against the inyenzi (“cockroaches”). After a
demonstration in Kigali calling for democratization, the regime openly stated that
“democratization” was nothing more than a cover for restoration of the Tutsi to positions
of political and socio-economic power—the Hutu now feared a sort of renewed Tutsi
hegemony and feudalism. Even more damning evidence of the regime’s tactics is
illustrated by their elaboration of what was then called the “Bahima conspiracy.”
According to the Habyarimana regime the Tutsi rebels had long been planning to
take over the Rwandan government. But in order to take control of the democratically
elected government, the minority Tutsi would somehow have to win a majority of the
votes from the then-Hutu leadership. The conspiracy claimed that the Burundian Tutsi
were willing to kill off enough of the Rwandan Hutu population to achieve their goals.
For the Rwandan people, if these claims made by the government were in fact true, they
would be at serious risk. The government continued to claim that the Tutsi were
themselves planning a genocide against the Hutu; unless the Hutu took preventative
measures, they would all be killed, or so claimed Juvenal Habyarimana.
Thanks to the Habyarimana administration’s tactics of fear-mongering the Hutu
population were incredibly nervous, wondering when this possible genocide might occur.
When Tutsi rebel forces shot down Juvenal Habyarimana’s plane, killing him, the Hutu
seemed to take this as the first steps toward their destruction. So, in response, they took
the regime’s suggestion and took preventative measures. Over the next hundred or so
days, hundreds of thousands of Rwandans were slaughtered. And the only real reason
was politics—Habyarimana’s fear of losing power directly caused so many deaths.
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Some may argue that this ethnic conflict (and ultimately the genocide) was caused
by the exit of the Belgian colonizers. Others may claim that it came as a result of growing
tensions between the Hutu and Tutsi. However, I would argue that politics caused most of
it. Indeed, the Belgians as well as both the Hutu and the Tutsi can and should, at least in
some part, be blamed. Nevertheless, it is the administration of President Kayibanda and
more so that of President Habyarimana that must shoulder much of the blame.
The actions of both regimes to stifle any hopes of liberalization for the Tutsi were
tragic and disastrous. Their mass murders and expulsions of so many Tutsi instilled in
both ethnic groups a hatred for the other. But the numerous lies and ill-made decisions of
the Habyarimana regime must be held directly accountable for the quick escalation in
ethnic violence. Juvenal Habyarimana knew that his country was in dire straits, and yet
he did nothing to help his people, Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa alike. Rather than putting money
into a desperate economy he used those funds to maintain his chokehold on political
power.
Rwanda should be considered a prime example of how a government can directly
influence the affairs of its people. Ethnic conflict had never been an issue prior to
colonization, but it became a major issue when the Hutu came to power. A few in
positions of power manipulated the people to their will, and as a result they left so many
dead in their wake. Possibly democratization or liberalization could have prevented these
tragedies. But ultimately it was the government that should have stopped this—yet it
instead lauded it. Hopefully many can learn from the mistakes that Rwanda made and
prevent ethnic conflict and genocide in the future.
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But tragically the circumstances surrounding the genocide in Rwanda in 1994
were not limited only to that event; indeed, Burundi experienced genocide under the same
circumstances in 1972 and again in 1993. Burundi, unlike Rwanda, however, found the
Tutsi suppressing the Hutu.
Similar to the lead-up to Rwanda’s genocide, the politicking of the Burundian
governmental administration over the minority ethnic group greatly exacerbated and
escalated tensions and ultimately violence. The Ndadaye administration, a Hutu
controlled group in a Tutsi controlled country, originally had attempted to smooth the
racial divide. These attempts constantly aimed to inject more and more Hutu into the
populations and more specifically into the echelons of the entrenched Tutsi army.
Ultimately this proved to be a fatal mistake for the then peaceful nation, as the Tutsi
eventually became enraged at the prospect of Hutu control in even limited circumstances.
While Ndadaye’s intentions were to improve the democracy of Burundi by
equalizing political participation among the ethnic groups of the countries, in practice his
policies oppressed a number of Tutsi and showed overt favoritism toward the Hutu.
Opposite of political liberalization, the 1993 genocide began with the murder of
prominent Hutu leaders, including Ndadaye himself, and with the eventual slaughter of
many more Hutu citizens by Tutsi radicalists.
In the 1993 Burundian genocide, Smith’s hypothesis of political liberalization
assuaging tensions was turned on its head. While the presidential administration
attempted to politically liberalize the nation, unfortunately the opposite was practiced.
The government’s good intentions were far from good practices—the intended outcome
bred Tutsi violence.
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Much more overt political participation was demonstrated in the 1972 Burundian
genocide, however. In this case, the Tutsi president Michel Micombero declared martial
law and demanded the slaughter of thousands of Hutu along with the expulsion of
numerous others from the country. Orchestrating a massive genocide of the minority
from within his own administration, Micombero exemplified the cause of the 1972
genocide. His administration’s policy of political suppression and overt expulsion were
the clear cause of the escalating violence of the two ethnic groups—nothing else can
possibly explain the speed and the vigor with which such an extermination was executed.
And this idea rings true also in 1993 and 1994 in both Burundi and Rwanda.
Indeed, with both ethnic groups committing genocide actions against the other—
the Tutsi against the Hutu in Burundi, and the Hutu against the Tutsi in Rwanda—little
evidence supports the claim that ethnicity and social problems contributed solely to the
various genocides in the countries. Rather domestic and external foreign factors
contributed immensely to the escalation of violence.
Foreign, or external, factors such as economic problems as well as foreign
national involvement in the Central African region, and sometimes more specifically in
Rwanda and Burundi, played at least some contributory role in growing ethnic tensions.
But more so, domestic factors like democratization and political liberalization, or lack
thereof, are inextricably linked to the amassing anger and tension by both sides in both
places. The political administrations, for instance, of Micombero and Ndadaye in Burundi
and of Kayibanda and Habyarimana in Rwanda are perhaps the best explanations for the
escalated and calculated violence of the genocides.
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As these administrations applied domestic political reform, be it in the form of
silencing the minority, or amplifying its voice, the government morphed political
liberalization into political suppression and oppression. With these the radicalized ethnic
groups were given approval to battle, harm, and slaughter one another. Whether overtly
or indirectly, the political systems in place in both Burundi and Rwanda at least tacitly
approved genocide time and time again.
Each government instigated ultimate genocide, whether intentionally or
incidentally. In Burundi, the Ndadaye administration clearly intended to provide
meaningful and peaceful change, hopefully lessening the recent divide between the Tutsi
and the Hutu. Nevertheless, good intentions were transformed into tragic violence, in the
midst of government weakness and loss of control. Unfortunately, the other cases of the
Micombero administration in Burundi and the Kayibanda and Habyarimana
administrations in Rwanda tell an obviously different story: government complicity and
support in ethnic violence. Each of these administrations, as the evidence suggests,
intentionally supported one group over the other, suggesting and even funding organized
violence. The Rwandan and Burundian governments fully understood the consequences
of wholesale murder of entire societal groups, and the consequence was simple: ultimate
economic and political power for the “better” group. As a result organized participation
by the national army and other groups followed and bloodshed ensued—all to be
exacerbated by the chaos that arose during the genocides. Nevertheless, regardless of
whether control was maintained or lost, government approval directly moved mere
ideology to action, preparation to genocide.
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The issues of how governments interact with the governed has always been
important, and in light of such events, they have become that much more important in
Central Africa. In a review of history, it is noticeable that violence pervades Africa and
the globe. But in a new era most violence is avoidable by simply supporting peaceful
debate and ultimate reconciliation. The need for these new tactics is obvious when
reviewing the genocides of Burundi and Rwanda. Nevertheless more research is required
to determine the methods by which reconciliation can be achieved and the means by
which non-violence is best advertised, especially in light of the potential consequences of
ignoring such tactics.
Indeed, these genocides have proven to be the ultimate blemishes upon the
histories of Rwanda and Burundi. Their tragedies still demand answer to the questions
that linger—why did these ethnic tensions emerge and so quickly lead to genocide and
then continue moving forward? Only when genocide was clearly decried by those in
power did it end and was it wiped, in some ways, from the public conscience. Still the
wounds remain; but now these wounds are viewed as markings of a new era—an era of
cooperation, not violence. These wounds have taught people of the wrongs committed by
their governments and politicians. These wounds, although they remain unhealed, have
healed much deeper wounds: the rifts between ethnic groups caused by the violence of
the nineteenth century.
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